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Abstract: For almost a century, the Netherlands was marked by a large market for
voluntary private health insurance alongside state-regulated social health
insurance. Throughout this period, private health insurers tried to safeguard their
position within an expanding welfare state. From an institutional logics
perspective, we analyze how private health insurers tried to reconcile the tension
between a competitive insurance market pressuring for selective underwriting and
actuarially fair premiums (the insurance logic), and an upcoming welfare state
pressuring for universal access and socially fair premiums (the welfare state logic).
Based on primary sources and the extant historiography, we distinguish six periods
in which the balance between both logics changed signiﬁcantly. We identify
various strategies employed by private insurers to reconcile the competing logics.
Some of these were temporarily successful, but required measures that were
incompatible with the idea of free entrepreneurship and consumer choice. We
conclude that universal access can only be achieved in a competitive individual
private health insurance market if this market is effectively regulated and
mandatory cross-subsidies are effectively enforced. The Dutch case demonstrates
that achieving universal access in a competitive private health insurance market is
institutionally complex and requires broad political and societal support.
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Introduction
The tension between public and private interests as a shaping force in mixed
welfare economies is well known (Baldwin, 1990). Nowhere does this tension
become more apparent than in public–private health insurance systems, which
seem to revolve around a permanent struggle to ﬁnd the right balance between
efﬁciency and solidarity, between counteracting adverse selection and guarantee-
ing universal access. The introduction of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010
by US president Barack Obama is the most recent example of this struggle. The
ACA effectively imposed a new ‘code of conduct’ onto the American private
health insurance industry by preventing insurance companies from denying
coverage to children due to a pre-existing condition, by prohibiting insurance
companies from rescinding coverage and applying lifetime limits on coverage and
by regulating the annual limits on coverage (Oberlander, 2016).
In 2006, the private health insurance industry in the Netherlands, providing
voluntary health insurance coverage for (at most) one-third of the population for
almost a century, also went through a major reform that profoundly changed the
rules of conduct. By this reform, the century-old mixed system of public and
private health insurances was exchanged for a mandatory universal health
insurance system based on managed competition between health care providers
and health insurance companies (Enthoven and Van de Ven, 2007; Van de Ven
and Schut, 2008).
Apart from the United States, there are only a few countries that can provide a
well-documented longitudinal case study for the dynamics of public–private
interaction in health insurance (Hacker, 2002; Lengwiler, 2010). The Dutch case
is one of them (Schut, 1995; Vonk, 2013). In this paper, we will elaborate on the
Dutch case, addressing the question how the emerging private health insurance
industry tried to reconcile the tension between a competitive insurance market
pressuring for selective underwriting and actuarially fair premiums, and an
upcoming welfare state pressuring for universal access and socially fair premiums.
Furthermore, we examine to what extent the various strategies to cope with this
tension were successful and sustainable. We analyzed these questions using a
conceptual framework that we built on the inﬂuential study by Ewald (1986)
about the shifting concept of risk and insurance in developing welfare states.
Conceptual framework: insurance logic and welfare state logic
In the Netherlands, a large market for voluntary private health insurance has
existed for almost the whole of the 20th century alongside the state-regulated
social health insurance system (established in 1941). Until 2006, ~30% of the
population in the Netherlands were privately insured (see Figure 1). Nowhere else
in Europe private health insurance was so extensive and so important (Colombo
and Tapay, 2004).
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Yet, the position of private health insurers was never undisputed. They had to
operate in an organizational ﬁeld in which health professionals, social health
insurance funds (known as sickness funds) and the state also had interests. The
dynamics of such an inter-institutional ﬁeld can be analyzed by adopting the
institutional logics perspective: private health insurance as a societal ﬁeld, shaped
by competing logics of different institutional orders (i.e. the state and the market).
Institutional logics are contingent sets of social norms (cultural rules and cognitive
structures) that shape the behaviour of individuals and organizations from a
certain institutional order (Thornton, 2004; Thornton et al., 2012).
In order to analyze how private health insurance in the Netherlands developed
over time and especially how this affected the position of private health insurers,
this paper employs the conceptual framework of two competing logics in health
insurance: a welfare state logic and an insurance logic.
The distinction between both logics is rooted in a fundamental difference in
deﬁning the nature of insurance. As Ewald (1986) pointed out, insurance systems
are either based on individual responsibility (the market) or social solidarity
(the state). With regard to health insurance, this distinction revolves around the
following question: is medical care a source of ﬁnancial loss or a fundamental
right? The insurance logic is based on the idea of insurance as an individual
responsibility. Covering health care expenses is people’s own responsibility, and
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Figure 1. Share of the Dutch population (in %) insured under social and private health
insurance, 1935–2005.
Source: Vonk (2013).
Note: In 2006, all insurance schemes were replaced by a single mandatory universal health
insurance scheme, carried out by competing health insurers (Health Insurance Act of 2006).
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elements of the insurance logic are private-sector administration, free will and
limited solidarity (limited accessibility, risk-rated premiums, medical under-
writing and so on). By contrast, the welfare state logic is rooted in the notion of
social solidarity. Health care expenses should be covered collectively by the state,
making accessible health care a civil right. The most important elements of the
welfare state logic are, among others, public-sector administration, compulsion,
universal accessibility and complete solidarity (Vonk, 2013).
Both logics are ideal types, the most extreme positions on either side of a con-
tinuum. They serve as a heuristic instrument in evaluating changes in predominant
visions for insuring health care over time. According to the institutional logics
perspective, changes occur through (i) historical events that act as critical junc-
tures and change path dependency by (re)shaping formal structures, introducing
new logics or by changing the balance between existing logics; (ii) boundary
bridging organizations/individuals (institutional entrepreneurs) that use differ-
ences in existing institutional logics to further their own interests; or (iii) structural
overlap (i.e. mergers) between organizations with different logics (Scott et al.,
2000; Thornton et al., 2012). All three elements are at play in the case of private
health insurance in the Netherlands.
Methods
This paper uses event history analysis and is based on key primary sources and the
extant historiography on socio-economic development of private health insurance
in the Netherlands (Schut, 1995; Companje et al., 2009; Vonk, 2013).1 By
applying our conceptual framework to the historical timeline, we can distinguish
ﬁve turning points in the history of private health insurance in the Netherlands in
which the balance between insurance logic and welfare state logic changed sig-
niﬁcantly. These turning points (or crises) were caused by the inherent instability
of a speciﬁc compromise between insurance and welfare state logic, external
shocks (i.e. war, economic recession) or a combination of both. Furthermore, the
institutional logic perspective makes it possible to identify key factors of change
(historical events, institutional entrepreneurs and structural overlap) for all
six periods.
1900–1940: the predominance of the insurance logic
In the period between 1900 and 1940, the insurance logic dominated thinking on
health insurance in the Netherlands. Though it was the subject of intense political
debate, a political majority of conservative liberals, orthodox Protestants and
1 The key primary sources that were consulted include the archives of the various private health
insurance associations, governmental archives, the archives of individual private health insurers, various
journals from the insurance press, specimens of health insurance policies and relevant policy documents
from the government and supervisory bodies (see Vonk, 2013 for a complete speciﬁcation).
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Catholics supported the view that health insurance was not the duty of the
government. Unlike most European countries, the Netherlands therefore did not
introduce state-regulated social health insurance (Companje et al., 2009; Hu and
Manning, 2010; Vonk, 2012).
This did not mean that there were no possibilities for Dutch citizens to buy
health insurance, yet all forms of insurance were based on voluntary contracts and
limited accessibility and limited solidarity. Around 1900, sickness fund insurances
dominated the market. They provided insurance aimed at the lower-income
groups. Membership was restricted by an income ceiling. The insurance scheme
itself was based on service beneﬁts covering pharmaceuticals and services pro-
vided by GPs. To this end, sickness funds paid physicians and pharmacists a
capitation fee: a ﬁxed payment per year for each enrolled person in their practice
(Companje et al., 2009). Capitation fees effectively transferred insurance risk
from sickness funds to providers. For sickness funds this made it easy to predict
expenses, and for GPs this implied a guaranteed income from low-income
patients. To limit the inﬂow of high-risk patients, sickness funds applied several
instruments to restrict the entry of new members. They only insured people living
in a certain ‘service area’, usually a city. High-risk groups, such as the chronically
ill, disabled, pregnant and elderly, could not join. Nearly all sickness funds applied
a waiting period. However, if money allowed, most sickness funds tried to be
lenient when it came to accepting high-risk individuals (Companje et al., 2009).
During the ﬁrst decades of the 20th century, sickness funds became increasingly
popular. By 1940, roughly 45% of the Dutch population had joined a sickness
fund. This expansion was mainly driven by the combination of an economic boom
during the 1910s and 1920s, the increased prestige of medical sciences and rising
prices for health services. This stimulated both the growth of the potential
membership base of sickness funds and the need for health insurance (Vonk, 2013).
However, this also stimulated the birth of a new form of health insurance. From
1907 onwards, a growing number of not-for-proﬁt and commercial private health
insurance companies were established, targeted at the middle-income groups
whose earnings exceeded the income threshold set by sickness funds and doctors.
Most of these new health insurance companies were mono-line insurers. They
offered indemnity-based insurance that covered a comprehensive set of beneﬁts:
GP treatment, prescription drugs, hospitalization and specialist treatment. Con-
trary to sickness funds, private health insurers worked nationwide. Furthermore,
they did not conclude contracts with physicians. Policyholders were treated as
private patients and got reimbursed afterwards. Instead of an insurance covering
the full costs of medical care, policyholders were free to determine the extent of
insurance coverage by choosing among different levels of cash reimbursement.
The emergence of private health insurance was supported by the Netherlands
Medical Association (NMG), who applauded the fact that private health insur-
ance was built around fee-for-service and indemnity payments. Although the
capitation fees paid by sickness funds provided physicians with a guaranteed
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income, they also came with a price: less professional autonomy, full waiting
rooms and moral hazard. The fear was that sickness funds would extend their
membership base to the middle- and high-income groups (Vonk, 2013).
Therefore, the NMG issued a Binding Decree (1912) for all its members,
roughly 90% of all Dutch physicians. Members were only allowed to sign
contracts with sickness funds that upheld the code of the NMG: restriction of the
sickness fund insurance scheme to low-income groups; representation of physi-
cians in sickness fund boards; and the obligation for sickness funds to offer
contracts to all physicians in their service area. This effectively split the market for
health insurances into a market for sickness fund insurances and a market for
private health insurance,2 separated by an income ceiling dictated by the NMG.
In the ﬁrst decades of private health insurance, an actuarial basis for setting
premiums was lacking, as the ﬁrst actuarial studies on health insurance were
conducted in Germany only in the mid-1930s (Feddersen, 1935; Tosberg, 1936).
Though insurers were aware of the threats of adverse selection and moral hazard,
the information asymmetry between applicants and insurer was extreme due to a
lack of data and appropriate statistical knowledge, which made risk-rating
virtually impossible. It is hardly surprising that during the ﬁrst decades of the
Dutch private health insurance industry roughly one-third of all insurers companies
were victim of fatal premium spirals, resulting in speedy bankruptcies or take-overs
(see Table 1): a classic example of a Rothschild–Stiglitz market (Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1976).
Table 1. Establishments, failures and take-overs of private health insurance compa-
nies in the Netherlands, 1907–2006a
Period New establishments Failures Take-overs Active insurers
1907–1910 7 – – 7
1911–1920 13 4 1 20
1921–1930 40 9 1 55
1931–1940 67 18 3 107
1941–1950 52 18 6 142
1951–1960 35 10 4 152
1961–1970 26 7 59 165
1971–1980 8 3 19 108
1981–1990 23 – 39 107
1991–2000 15 1 54 82
2000–2006 5 1 26 43
Source: Vonk (2013).
a1907: ﬁrst establishment; 2006: introduction universal mandatory health insurance
(Health Insurance Act).
2 Notice that both sickness funds and private health insurers were private entities, and that the term
‘private health insurer’ was originally used to distinguish insurers covering ‘private patients’ from insurers
covering ‘sickness fund patients’.
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In order to keep their insurance plans ﬁnancially sound, insurers applied crude
instruments: stringent risk selection by restrictive pre-existing condition clauses;
denying insurance of elderly, chronically ill, handicapped newborns and pregnant
women; and non-renewal or even premature cancellation of policies with high
claim rates (Schut, 1995). Keeping high-risk individuals out of the risk pool was
not seen as harsh, but as a sign of responsible management and fairness (Kunne-
man, 1951). Without such practices, private insurers simply could not survive in
the prevailing highly competitive market.
Nevertheless, the NMG was highly critical of the private health insurance industry.
They condemned risk selection, the premature cancellation of insurance contracts and
the fact that insurers openly professed their ‘pursuit of proﬁt’ (Vonk, 2013). At the same
time, local hospital insurance associations, established in rural areas, proved that
restricting coverage to hospitalization and specialist care had major advantages. The
demand for hospital and specialist care was much less price-elastic and thus susceptible
tomoral hazard than the demand for primary care and prescription drugs. Furthermore,
rural hospital insurance associations did not compete as they only offered insurance to
members of their local community. This made these local insurers less vulnerable to
adverse selection, and allowed them to adopt a policy of almost open enrolment. As a
result, local hospital insurance funds were considerably cheaper and more stable than
the traditionalmore comprehensive private insurers and thus easier to sell (Vonk, 2013).
The example of the highly successful rural hospital insurance associations was
soon followed by large multiple-line insurance companies. During the 1930s, they
started to offer the same specialised hospital insurance plans. These companies had a
different attitude towards health insurance. Their approach towards health insur-
ance was based on fostering customer relations. Contrary to other insurance pro-
ducts, health insurance usually involved frequent contact between insurer and
insured, making it an ideal instrument to build trust and cross-sell more proﬁtable
products. This also meant that for multiple-line insurance companies limited losses
were acceptable and could be compensated by the proﬁts made in other branches,
which enabled them to be more lenient (Vonk, 2013).
With the entry of larger insurance companies, the market for private health
insurance started to grow signiﬁcantly. By 1940, about 15% of the population
had joined a local hospital insurance association and roughly 10% a private
(commercial) health insurer (see Figure 1).
1941–1945: the birth of a public–private system and a new logic
Roughly 70% of the Dutch population had some form of health insurance at
the start of the 1940s (see Figure 1). According to some, this proved that the
Netherlands did not need state-run health insurance: business and civil society
were doing the job just as well (Vonk, 2013). Yet, during the 1930s the welfare
state logic had taken ﬁrm roots in Europe, where governments were increasingly
concerned with guaranteeing access to health care (Hu and Manning, 2010).
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In the Netherlands the welfare state logic was introduced during the German
occupation in World War II.
In November 1941, the German occupying authorities issued the Sickness
Funds Decree, which established a mandatory social health insurance scheme for
wage earners limited by an income threshold and carried out by ofﬁcially licensed
sickness funds. The funds were obliged to accept all eligible applicants (ca. 45% of
the population). Sickness funds were allowed to offer voluntary health insurance
to the self-employed, as long as their incomewas below the set ceiling. The beneﬁts
of the mandatory scheme covered a broad spectrum of medical care, including
hospitalization and specialist treatment. All persons with an income above the set
income ceiling had to pay for health care from their own resources or through
voluntary private health insurance (Vonk, 2012).
Mandatory social health insurance was ﬁnanced by uniform state-determined
income-related premiums of which both employee and employer paid half.
The revenues were collected in a general fund from which sickness funds were
retrospectively reimbursed. Hence, sickness funds were not at risk for offering
mandatory insurance. This was not the case with the voluntary scheme for the
lower-income self-employed. The government had set the rules: open enrolment,
no age limits and community-rated premiums and a standard set of beneﬁts. Yet,
sickness funds were the primary risk carriers since expenses of the voluntary
scheme had to be fully ﬁnanced by premium revenues. Furthermore, those eligible
for the voluntary social health insurance could also opt for private health insurance
(Schut, 1995).
The introduction of social health insurance in the Netherlands had major reper-
cussions for private health insurance companies. They initially lost between half and
two-thirds of their insured (see Figure 1). Yet, this did not mean the end of the private
health insurance industry. Even though the state did take a more active role in health
insurance, the Sickness Funds Decree effectively created a mixed public–private
system of social and private insurances with two competing logics centred around the
state (welfare state logic) and the market (insurance logic). This external shock
profoundly changed the Dutch health insurance landscape, but what remained
unclear was whether this system would be maintained after the war (Vonk, 2013).
1946–1956: insurance logic under ﬁre
Private insurers had ample reason to be worried. During its wartime exile in
London, the Dutch government had designed plans for a new system of social
security in the Netherlands. A special government committee chaired by Aart van
Rhijn advocated the institution of a system of social security based on the welfare
state logic captured in the English Beveridge report (Kappelhof, 2004). The Van
Rhijn plan included a plan for universal health insurance paid for by amix of taxes
and income-related premiums. After the war, however, this plan proved to be
politically unfeasible (Companje et al., 2009; Vonk, 2012).
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Despite the failure of the Van Rhijn plan, its underlying principles of solidarity
and universal access had gained considerable support. Nevertheless, until the late
1950s private health insurers continued their prewar practices based on the
insurance logic, such as non-renewal and the interim termination of insurance
contracts and the exclusion of high-risk individuals. In the light of the newwelfare
state logic, however, these practices were increasingly controversial. Private health
insurers became the target of severe criticism in the media and the political arena.
Denying or terminating insurance contracts based on pre-existing conditions were
no longer seen as instruments of responsible entrepreneurship but as attacks on
universal access to health care (Vonk, 2013).
The fact that the private health insurance industry came under closer societal
scrutiny fuelled the drive of sickness funds to break through the boundaries of
social health insurance. Ever since the introduction of social health insurance in
1941, sickness funds felt that they were ‘reduced’ to mere carriers of a state-run
scheme. They aimed to restore a certain degree of autonomy. From 1947 onwards,
regional conglomerates of sickness funds started to establish their own private
health insurance companies called ‘superstructures’ (Schut, 1995; Vonk, 2013). In
contrast to the existing private health insurers, which were either commercial or
mutual companies, these entities were all not-for-proﬁt foundations. By estab-
lishing their own private insurers, sickness funds could offer guaranteed access to
private health insurance to enrollees that were losing their eligibility for social
health insurance due to exceeding the income threshold. Due to the close link with
the sickness funds, foundations could beneﬁt from lower administration and
acquisition costs and a steady inﬂow of healthy new policyholders. As a result,
they were able to cover a broad range of beneﬁts for a relatively low premium
(Schut, 1995; Vonk, 2013). The superstructure insurance was immensely suc-
cessful. From 1950 to 1959 the market share of private insurance foundations
increased from 8 to 40%, whereas the market share of commercial health insurers
dropped from 57 to 35% (see Figure 2).
Foundations were formally separated from the sickness funds, but in practice
were run by the same board of directors and used the same administration.
Although this violated the intended separation of social and private health
insurance, the government was satisﬁed with the formal split-up. This ofﬁcially
established the right of sickness funds to provide private health insurance. Yet, it
also conﬁrmed the right of private health insurance to exist. Government ofﬁcials
were well aware that the existence of a private market was of vital importance for
social health insurance. Medical professionals were willing to accept capitation
fees and lower prices for medical services under social health insurance, because
they were able to compensate this by raising the prices for private patients
(Companje et al., 2009; Vonk, 2013).
Public and private health insurance started to integrate. The commercial health
insurance industry, however, lost out to the sickness funds on two fronts. They did
not only lose customers because of the stiff competition from the private insurance
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foundations, but also due to the expansion of the eligible population for manda-
tory social health insurance. The strict underwriting practices of private insurers
had resulted in increasing social and political pressure to expand social health
insurance. This gradual ‘socialization’ of private health insurance was not only
disliked by the private insurers themselves but also by the medical association
because it reduced the more proﬁtable private practice.3 Hence, traditional private
health insurers were faced with mounting pressure from both society and the
medical profession to relax underwriting stringency. This pressure was reinforced
by the success of the private insurance foundations that were better able to
accommodate these expectations.
1957–1967: collusion as strategy to bridge conﬂicting logics
Private health insurance was in crisis. It was clear that a health insurance system in
which insurance and welfare state logic were neatly separated was no longer
tenable. Something had to change. Traditional private insurers gradually began to
adopt elements from the welfare state logic. They realised, however, that this
strategy was vulnerable to adverse selection and could only survive if competition
















Figure 2. Aggregate market shares of the three types of private health insurers, 1950–1995.
Source: Vonk (2013), Schut (1995).
3 The medical association was an important and powerful ally of the private insurance industry in its
resistance to the expansion of social health insurance. During the 1950s, the medical association effectively
put pressure on the government to restrict the increase of the income threshold that determined eligibility for
social health insurance (Juffermans, 1982).
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major ones, agreed to set up a cartel by issuing a uniform health plan, known as
the General Netherlands Health Insurance Policy (abbreviated as ANPZ policy).
The terms of this ANPZ policy were much more beneﬁcial than those of the
preceding commercial policies, and could meet the terms offered by the founda-
tions. Speciﬁcally, the ANPZ policy covered a broad range of beneﬁts at a
community-rated premium, was non-terminable by the insurer, did accept all
newborn children irrespective of health status, did no longer use a waiting time for
reimbursement at the start of contract period and offered a guarantee of full-risk
transfer through unlimited reimbursement of medical expenses instead of ﬁxed
indemnity payments. In addition to the uniform ANPZ policy, 35 commercial
insurers established a high-risk pool for all substandard risks losing their eligibility
for social health insurance. The terms of the high-risk pool contract were largely
comparable to those of the ANPZ policy, except that the premium was sub-
stantially higher. The losses of the risk pool were evenly spread among all parti-
cipating companies. Nevertheless, risk selection was not abandoned, as selective
underwriting and pre-existing condition clauses were still commonly used (Schut,
1995; Vonk, 2013).
By joining a cartel, commercial private health insurers were able to combine the
insurance logic with elements of the welfare state logic and managed to compete
with the fast-growing private insurance foundations. Furthermore, in due course
the private insurance foundations learned that they too could not fully escape the
insurance logic. In 1960, the largest insurance foundation (AZR) went bankrupt
as a result of adverse selection due to a combination of non-selective underwriting
and very low community-rated premiums (Schut, 1995; Vonk, 2013). AZR’s
portfolio was largely taken over by several commercial insurers. This did not only
enable commercial insurers to regain some of their lost market share (see Figure 2),
but also to strengthen their reputation as responsible and reliable health insurers.
While guaranteed universal access was still a bridge too far, the adoption of
important elements of the welfare state logic enhanced the ongoing integration of
the commercial health insurance industry into the larger system of health care
ﬁnancing. This integration was not exclusively based on the social ‘U-turn’ the
insurance industry had made. The system of ‘hidden’ cross-subsidization between
social and private health insurance, especially concerning the prices of medical
services, had become another important reason for this. By the 1960s, private
patients paid up to nine times higher prices for medical services than patients
covered under social health insurance (Vonk, 2013). Social insurance relied on
private health insurance to keep prices as low as possible.
In 1967, the government indirectly forced private health insurers to further
embrace the welfare state logic, by proposing a national insurance scheme for
long-term care that would also include hospitalization and specialist treatment.
This caused massive uproar not only among private health insurers but also
among sickness funds and physicians. In order to thwart this ‘unholy’ plan, sick-
ness funds and physicians put the pressure on commercial health insurers to solve
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the problem of risk selection. After all, the existence of risk selection was the main
reason the plan got political support. The private health insurance industry
buckled and guaranteed universal access through market-wide high-risk pooling
via a mutual reinsurance fund (abbreviated as NOZ). By offering guaranteed
universal access to health care, the private health insurance industry had effec-
tively removed the main argument underlying the proposed plan. Hospital care
and specialist treatment were taken out of the long-term care insurance scheme
(the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act, abbreviated as AWBZ) that was enacted
in 1968 (Companje et al., 2009).
The reason behind this fateful step by private insurers was straightforward:
health insurance had become too important a product for them to lose. In 1968,
private health insurance accounted for roughly 30% of total non-life insurance
premiums (Schut, 1995). The successful incorporation of the most important
welfare state principles by the commercial insurance sector was rewarded by an
ofﬁcial recognition by the government. In 1968, private health insurers were
designated alongside sickness funds as administrators of the newmandatory long-
term care insurance scheme. This also implied that private insurers were granted
seats on various ofﬁcial advisory and administrative bodies.
The assimilation of the welfare state logic fundamentally changed the nature
of the private health insurance industry. It introduced the idea of collective
responsibility. A welfare arrangement, based on universal accessibility and broad
coverage, could only be achieved in private health insurance through close
cooperation. Competition was excluded as far as possible through cartels, a formal
consultative structure and informal ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ (Vonk, 2013).
1968–1985: the limits of solidarity in a private market
For a time, it appeared that a new equilibrium was established. Welfare state logic
would predominate in private health insurance too, but the balance between
insurance practice and the principles of the welfare state was very delicate. This
became painfully clear in the period between 1968 and 1986. The self-imposed
code of conduct (welfare state logic) severely limited the room for private health
insurers to respond to external events and changing circumstances, such as the
cost explosion in health care during the 1970s and the emerging individualization.
Self-regulation by private insurers had created a system of universal access, but in
due course this system became increasingly exposed to self-induced adverse
selection, which gradually undermined the fragile equilibrium. During the 1960s,
health care costs exploded after a decade of post-war austerity needed to rebuild
the economy. As a consequence, the difference in health care expenses between
low-risk and high-risk individuals increased. Since risk-rating was not only
socially controversial but also still practically infeasible due to a lack of sufﬁcient
data and actuarial knowledge, all private health insurers charged essentially
community-rated premiums.
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Given the growing dispersion in individual health care expenses, maintaining
community rating required increasing cross-subsidies between risk groups.
Undifferentiated community-rated premiums made companies with a large share
of elderly or other high-risk individuals increasingly less attractive to young, low-
risk individuals. Particularly the larger commercial health insurers were suffering
from rapidly ageing portfolios and were increasingly threatened by premium
death spirals. Meanwhile, the actuarial knowledge of private insurers had
increased signiﬁcantly, especially after the creation of a shared ‘health insurance
information centre’, KISG, in 1975. Private insurers gained insight into the variation
of individual medical expenses and the associated personal characteristics. This
further undermined the delicate equilibrium in the private health insurance
market.
Premium differentiation by experience rating seemed to be the next logical step.
However, the room for this was limited. At the beginning of the 1970s, the steady
economic growth that had lasted for nearly twenty years was beginning stall,
resulting in a period of “stagﬂation”, a combination of economic stagnation and
persistently high price inﬂation (Van Zanden, 1998). The government’s strategy
to battle price inﬂation was to impose general limits on price increases. For private
health insurers, these price controls limited the room for premium differentiation
across age or risk groups. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether commercial insurers
really wanted to differentiate premiums. During the 1970s, serious proposals to
introduce a national health insurance scheme were formulated, resulting in 1976
in a draft bill to implement such a scheme. Commercial insurers were well aware
that the introduction of risk-rated premiums would give the government all the
ammunition it needed to nationalize private health insurance (Vonk, 2013).
Given that premium differentiation was not fully feasible and politically unat-
tractive, the only possible way commercial health insurers saw to avoid a premium
death spiral was to attract low-risk individuals by introducing new insurance
policies with high deductibles. At the start of the 1970s, the post-war baby-boom
generation was coming of age, and the commercial insurers expected to attract a
high number of new low-risk customers by these high deductible plans. This
strategy, however, backﬁred. High deductible policies were soon copied by most
other health insurers, with the notable exception of most insurance foundations
because deductibles, co-payments and risk-rating were deemed incompatible with
the solidarity principles they adhered to. Several small mutual not-for-proﬁt
insurers, however, stole a march on commercial insurers. Because of their small
and young portfolios, they could match any premium discount offered by com-
mercial insurers and still be more generous. Contrary to commercial insurers
who still used agents to sell insurance products, the mutual health insurers had
discovered the beneﬁts of direct-writing and had started aggressive marketing
campaigns to attract new subscribers (Schut, 1995; Vonk, 2013).
In addition, the Dutch Consumers Union became an active player in the market
by starting in 1968 to publish overviews of all health insurance premiums and
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other policy conditions and advising its members to switch to lower-priced
health insurers and opt for high deductible health plans. By improving consumer
information, however, the Consumers Union unintendedly contributed to the
unravelling of the delicate market equilibrium that was created.4
The tension caused by the ageing of commercial portfolios led to a restoration of
the insurance logic. After the strategy of high deductibles had failed and the
political threat of national health insurance scheme had diminished after a change
of government in 1977, in 1980 commercial insurers desperately tried to escape
from a premium death spiral by introducing age-related premiums. But again they
were outmanoeuvred by the mutual insurers who could always offer a lower
premium. The growth of mutual health insurers soon eclipsed the growth of all
other private health insurers (see Figure 2). Their market share increased, mostly
at the expense of the commercial health insurers.
The introduction of high deductibles and age-related premiums marked the
beginning of an internal crisis deﬁned by stiff competition and decreasing risk
solidarity that swept through the entire health insurance system. Eventually, even
foundations started to offer policies with high deductibles, and, subsequently,
age-related premiums (Vonk, 2013). This eroded the pillars of the carefully
constructed system of health care ﬁnancing in which public and private health
insurance had become institutionally and ﬁnancially integrated. As a result of the
increasing competition in the private health insurance market, the voluntary social
health insurance scheme for self-employed collapsed. People insured under
voluntary social health insurance were free to opt out anytime, making voluntary
social insurance vulnerable to ‘cream skimming’ given that its premiums were
community-rated by law. Lured away by cheaper health insurance policies with
high deductibles and/or differentiated premiums, low-risk enrolees opted for
private health insurance. This led to an increasing share of elderly and high-risk
enrolees in the voluntary scheme, which subsequently led to rapidly rising premiums
(Schut, 1995; Vonk, 2013).
In the 1980s, the voluntary social health insurance scheme was virtually
bankrupt. The rapidly worsening risk pool required increasing government
subsidies to keep premiums affordable. Therefore, the government brought the
private insurers back into line. In 1986, the voluntary scheme was dissolved and
its membership base, roughly 2.5 million people, was divided between mandatory
social health insurance and private health insurance according to income. The
government started to regulate the private health insurance industry to ensure
access of high-risk individuals to the private health insurance market. By the Act
on Access to Health Insurance (abbreviated asWTZ), private health insurers were
required to issue standardised health insurance policies for people over the age of
65 years and other speciﬁc high-risk groups at a legally determined affordable
4 As also theoretically shown, enhancing consumer choice in the presence of high cost variation and
community rating may reduce welfare by inducing adverse selection (Handel et al., 2015).
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maximum premium. Deﬁcits on these standardised policies were pooled and paid
for by a uniform surcharge imposed on all privately insured. Hence, elementary
principles of welfare state logic (i.e. universal access and risk solidarity) now
became legally anchored in private health insurance. Most of the enrolees of the
former voluntary sickness fund scheme were automatically transferred to the
private foundations that were still closely allied to the sickness funds, resulting in a
substantial increase of the foundations market share (see Figure 2) and a further
diminishing role of the commercial insurers.
At the same time, the ﬂow of money between private and social health insurance
was institutionalised to compensate for the larger share of elderly people within
the social health insurance scheme resulting from the reform. A system of
mandatory cross-subsidization from private health insurance to mandatory social
health insurance was created ﬁnanced by amandatory ‘solidarity’ surcharge levied
on the privately insured.
Still, this form of external intervention in health insurance did not address the deeper
causes of the accessibility problem of private health insurance: the growing predictable
variation in individual health care costs required increasing premium differentiation
and increasing surcharges to keep the premium of the standardised insurance policies
for the elderly and high-risk groups affordable. As shown in Figure 3, over the years the
health care costs at a higher age increased relatively fast, resulting in growing differ-
ences in medical expenses across age. For instance, from 1968 to 1990 the average
hospital costs of privately insured aged 80–84 years increased from three to about eight
times the average hospital costs of those aged 45–49 years.5
To solve this problem, the government proposed to set up a legally based
internal claims equalization scheme (abbreviated as ILPZ) aimed at alleviating the
problems of those insurance companies who were faced with rapidly rising costs
of ageing portfolios. The organization of this scheme was left in the hands of the
private health insurance industry. However, since such a scheme was clearly not in
the interest of insurers with a favourable risk portfolio, the private insurers failed
to come up with a workable claims equalization scheme (Vonk, 2013).
This failure provoked further government intervention. In 1991, an amendment
of the Act on Access to Health Insurance (WTZ) made the standardised policy
open to everyone who paid more for his or her current private health plan than the
legal maximum premium that was set for the standardised policy. This amend-
ment provided the government with a powerful instrument to limit private health
insurance premiums. From 1990 to 2005, the maximum premium in the private
health insurance was effectively reduced from about twice to about 1.5 times the
average private health insurance premium (KISG, 1991; Vektis, 2006).
The result was a rapid expansion of the share of the standardised insurance
policies, to about one-third of total expenses covered by private health insurance
5 A similar trend of health expenditure proﬁles for elderly people becoming steeper over time is
observed in German private health insurance from 1979 to 1990 (Buchner and Wasem, 2006).
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(for about 10%of the privately insured) (Vektis, 2006). Private health insurers did
not incur any ﬁnancial risk on these regulated policies since all deﬁcits were
retrospectively compensated from a pool that was ﬁlled by mandatory surcharges
paid by all privately insured. Therefore, insurers had strong incentives to encou-
rage high-risk individuals to opt for a standardised policy and had no longer any
incentives to control the costs of the most expensive subscribers.
The subsequent government interventions in the private health insurance
market effectively guaranteed universal access and substantially eased the pro-
blems for insurers with an unfavourable risk portfolio. But these interventions
also instigated a gradual socialization of the private health insurance industry,
paving the way for a more comprehensive reform of the health insurance system.
1986–2006: blending logics – the ascent of managed competition
In 1986, the government decided that a more extensive reorganization of the
health care ﬁnancing system was in order, and appointed a special committee, led
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Figure 3. Ratio of average hospital cost per age category relative to the hospital cost of age
category 45–49 for the privately insured in the Netherlands, 1968–1990.
Source: De Wit (1969), KISG (1981, 1986, 1991).
Note: The 1968 curve is an estimated Gompertz formula based on data from one of the
largest private health insurers (6% market share); the other three curves are based on data
from the Health Insurance Information Center (KISG), including data from 55% of the
privately insured in 1980, 75% in 1985 and 84% in 1990.
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the acronym ‘Dekker plan’, the committee proposed to remove the traditional
distinction between public and private health insurance. It should be replaced by a
form of standard insurance in which elements of insurance logic and welfare state
logic were combined. The Dekker plan proposed a mandatory basic insurance for
the entire population, with legislation to guarantee risk solidarity and universal
accessibility, including partly income-related and partly community-rated pre-
miums, guaranteed issue and risk equalization. The system also incorporated
elements of insurance logic, such as consumer choice among competing insurers
and private-sector administration (Vonk, 2013).
The idea was that adequately managed (or regulated) competition among
insurers and care providers would lead to greater efﬁciency while guaranteeing
universal access. Health insurers would be provided with incentives and tools to
act as prudent buyers of health care on behalf of their enrolees, instead of being
merely administrative bodies or pure indemnity insurers. To that end, health
insurers would be able to attract customers by offering better contracts at lower
community-rated premiums, and would be allowed to selectively contract or
integrate with health care providers. Among health insurers the Dekker plan
received mixed reactions. Most sickness funds and private insurance foundations
were fervently in favour of the idea. Commercial health insurers, on the other
hand, were not enthusiastic at all. In their view, the Dekker plan would mean an
extension of social health insurance. Even though the Dekker plan allowed private
insurance and proﬁts, health insurance itself would be ﬁrmly rooted in the welfare
state logic: mandatory insurance, guaranteed issue, standardised beneﬁts, risk
equalization and premiums that would be partly community-rated and partly
income-related.
Furthermore, if the Dekker plan came into being, nothing could stop the merger
of sickness funds and the allied private insurance foundations. How could the
relatively small commercial health insurers possibly compete with organizations
that insured millions? For commercial health insurers it was of fundamental
importance that social and private health insurance remained separated. Still, the
private health insurance industry had ran out of possibilities to compensate or
adapt. The setup of a legally based internal claims equalization scheme (ILPZ),
which could have led to a sustainable and accessible private health insurance
market – if it had worked – was torpedoed by insurers themselves (Vonk, 2013).
In 1992, a ﬁrst attempt to implement the Dekker plan met with strong resistance
from a coalition of employers and private health insurers and further imple-
mentation was effectively blocked by the Senate (Helderman et al., 2005).
Nevertheless, the government managed to implement several crucial changes,
which in due course would pave the way for the integration of private and social
health insurance. First, consumer choice of sickness funds was introduced by
abolishing the ﬁxed regional sickness fund areas. Second, in mandatory social
health insurance a community-rated premium was introduced next to the
prevailing uniform income-related contribution, covering about 15% of total
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expenses. Since sickness funds were free to set the community-rated premium, this
measure enabled them to compete on price. Third, sickness funds were put at
ﬁnancial risk by the introduction of prospective risk-adjusted capitation payments
instead of the traditional full cost reimbursement. Fourth, sickness funds were
allowed to selectively contract with outpatient care providers instead of being
required to contract any willing provider at uniform conditions. Finally, the
existing barriers between social and private health insurance were partly removed
by allowing private health insurers to establish their own sickness fund. In the
years that followed, private health insurers merged with sickness funds and the
latter branched out into private health insurance (Vonk, 2013).
The Dekker plan heralded the beginning of the end for the commercial private
health insurers. The proposed government-controlled market was not one in
which the commercial private insurers wished to operate. Moreover, many health
insurers realised that they wanted something that was not really possible: fully
private insurance that could compete with social insurance in terms of coverage,
premiums and accessibility, and also enabled them to make a proﬁt.
Consequently, since the mid-1990s, commercial private insurers started to
withdraw from the market (Vonk, 2013).
During the 1990s, strict supply regulation to control health care expenditures
resulted in growing waiting lists (Schut and Varkevisser, 2013). Due to major
reforms of workers’ compensation insurance, employers became individually
responsible for workers’ compensation during the ﬁrst year of sickness absentee-
ism. Hence, employers became more worried about the growing waiting lists than
about cost containment. This resulted in a change of position from opponents to
supporters of a more market-oriented health care system. As a consequence, the
private health insurers, whose position was already weakened during the 1990s,
lost a strong ally in their resistance against a fundamental reform of the health
insurance system.
The stalled comprehensive reform of the early 1990s had left the health insur-
ance system partially reformed and unstable. Sickness funds and private health
insurers operated more or less on the same terms, which made it harder to explain
why there was still a distinction between social and private health insurance. The
call for ‘real’ reform became stronger and was backed by external support of both
unions and employer associations and the growing public discontent about
growing waiting lists due to supply regulation. In 2001, the government released a
new proposal (Vraag aan bod) with an outline of a new health care and insurance
system with similar features as the former Dekker plan (Helderman et al., 2005).
Five years later, an adapted version of this proposal was ﬁnally endorsed by
parliament as the new Health Insurance Act (HIA). With the introduction of the
HIA in 2006, theNetherlands hit the international headlines. Themarket-oriented
overhaul of the Dutch health insurance system was seen by many observers as a
successful effort of deregulation and privatization of a classic welfare system. The
old dual system of social and private health insurance was replaced by a universal
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mandatory health insurance scheme with competing health insurers under
private law.6
Despite the apparent elements of insurance logic in the new system, most
commercial private health insurance companies had already left the market, and
the few remaining sold their health insurance portfolio. With its features of uni-
versal access, guaranteed issue, risk equalization, prescribed beneﬁts, a combina-
tion of community-rated and income-related premiums and income-related care
allowances, the new health insurance scheme came closer to a system based on the
welfare state logic than a system based on the logic of insurance. As a matter of
fact, the HIA effectively incorporated the insurance logic in a framework based on
the welfare state logic. This was only feasible due to the development of an
increasingly sophisticated system of risk equalization that made it possible to
overcome adverse selection problems in a competitive health insurance market
with community-rated premiums.
Conclusion
The Dutch history of voluntary private health insurance shows both the strengths
and weaknesses of public–private health insurance systems, especially in the
context of a rising demand for (universal) access to health care. As we have
explained, social and private health insurance are based on two divergent logics of
different institutional orders (the market and the state). The intrinsic gap can be
temporarily overcome, but it takes measures that are incompatible with and/or
contradictory to the idea of entrepreneurship in a free market.
The Dutch case strongly suggests that universal access can only be achieved in a
competitive individual private health insurance market if this market is effectively
regulated. The tension between adverse selection and universal access that had
vexed the Dutch private health insurance industry throughout its existence was
resolved by combining elements from both the insurance logic and the welfare
state logic: i.e. an individual mandate, guaranteed issue, community-rated pre-
miums, income-related subsidies and a sophisticated risk equalization scheme
(Van de Ven and Schut, 2011).
However, the Dutch case also shows this was not done overnight and not
always intentionally. The German occupation during WWII was of fundamental
importance. It reshaped health insurance and introduced the welfare state logic.
During the following decades, state pressure and the work of boundary bridging
organizations (the foundations), which acted as mediators between the worlds of
social and private health insurance, ensured that private health insurers assimi-
lated the welfare state logic. During the 1980s, increasing structural overlap
between the market and the state in health insurance through both legislation and
6 Next to the mandatory health insurance scheme, a small voluntary private market for supplementary
health insurance remained, covering additional beneﬁts (primarily dental care for adults and physical
therapy).
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mergers between sickness funds and private health insurers led to the emergence of
a new institutional logic (managed competition) in which the insurance and wel-
fare state logic were blended.
A ﬁnal lesson from the Dutch case is that achieving universal access in a com-
petitive private health insurance market is institutionally complex and requires
broad political and societal support. While the US Affordable Care Act (ACA)
contains key elements of an appropriate regulation of private health insurance,
such as an individual mandate and cross-subsidies, it seems to lack a congruent
logic supported by health insurers, medical professionals and state and federal
governments. This makes the ACA a vulnerable and incomplete solution (Ober-
lander, 2016). This is exempliﬁed by the recent repeal of the federal individual
mandate, as approved by US Congress by the end of 2017, which is likely to
exacerbate adverse selection and to result in a large increase in the number of
uninsured (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, 2017). Notwithstanding this, the ACA
can also be the stepping stone for the expansion of the welfare state logic. The
Dutch case also shows that once a new logic is introduced it is there to stay. In the
US, this is illustrated by an increasing number of states that are enacting measures
to stabilize the ACA marketplaces, for instance by creating state versions of the
individual mandate (Bluth, 2018).
Whether the tensions between the insurance and welfare state logics in the
Netherlands have been permanently settled, however, remains to be seen, as the
new role of health insurers as purchasing agents for their enrollees is still disputed
and subject of ongoing societal debate (Boonen and Schut, 2011; Maarse et al.,
2016).
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